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Abstract
The evidential problem of evil involves a rarely discussed challenge, namely the
challenge of defending theism against the hypothesis of a morally indifferent cre-
ator. Our argument uses a Bayesian framework and it starts by showing that if the
only alternative to classical theism is naturalistic atheism, then fine-tuning can
render theism virtually certain, even in the face of evil. But if the alternatives
include the hypothesis of a morally indifferent creator, theism is defeated even if the
fine-tuning premise is accepted. The resulting version of the evidential problem is
unsolvable using the tools that are currently deployed by theists against evil.
Keywords Alternative theologies  Bayesianism  Problem of evil
We will use Bayesianism to model the debate over the evidential significance of
evil. A Bayesian solution to the problem of evil (BSPE) is an argument that has the
following conclusion:
(B) P(Theism | Evil & R) is significantly high
where R is the rest of our evidence.
It is important to note that a BSPE may not amount to a defence or a theodicy.
A theodicy purports to explain God’s actual reasons for permitting evil, whereas a
defence tells a story that, for all we know, could be true, and would, if true, explain
why God permits evil. But a BSPE need not do either of those things, because
(B) can hold even if it is subjectively quite improbable that God would permit evil.
Our starting point will be a BSPE that has the following premises:
(P1) The a priori probability of theism may be quite low but it is not spectacularly
low
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(P3) The subjective probability of fine-tuning conditional on atheism is
spectacularly low
(P4) Either classical theism (Judaeo–Christian–Muslim monotheism) or
naturalistic atheism is true
(P5) Our total evidence regarding the truth or falsity of theism consists of evil plus
the fact that the universe is fine-tuned for life
In the next section, we show that these premises ground a successful BSPE. In
‘‘Enter Moloch’’, we show if one relaxes (P4) by recognizing alternative theologies
(specifically, by recognizing the possibility of a morally indifferent creator), then
the Bayesian case for classical theism flounders. Finally, we examine potential ways
to resist one specific indifferent-creator scenario. We argue that extant theistic
strategies for dealing with the evidential problem fail and theism is defeated.
Our central claim is that the evidential problem of evil has a neglected aspect that
can be studied through a Bayesian lens. The evidential problem of evil is in fact (at
least) two different problems, the problem of defending theism against naturalistic
atheism and the problem of defending theism against certain alternative theologies,
for example, against the hypothesis of a morally indifferent creator. The latter
controversy turns on a priori issues that seem to lack convincing theistic solutions.
Throughout the paper, we presuppose that Bayesianism is the right logic of
abduction. This presupposition may sound controversial. There are well-known
complaints against Bayesianism—for example, one can question the very notion of
subjective probabilities (Horgan 2017), or one can reject the principle that
subjective probability ought to be maximized (Buchak 2014). The paper is long
enough as it is, so we won’t address these points. Nor will we make a plea for
Bayesianism specifically within the philosophy of religion. We are content to point
to pioneering works in this area, such as Dougherty and McBrayer (2014) and
Swinburne (2004). Those who are inclined to resist our argument solely on the
grounds that it uses Bayesian methods are very welcome to suggest a better system
of abductive logic.
If (P1)–(P5) are true, then (B) is true
Suppose that our evidence regarding the truth or falsity theism is exhausted by the
following propositions:
NE There is natural evil (evil brought about by the lawlike operation of natural
causes) in the amount, variety, and distribution as we actually find it
ME There is moral evil (evil brought about by the free actions of human
beings) in the amount, variety, and distribution as we actually find it
Evil ME & NE
Tuning Physical constants are fine-tuned in a way that the existence of life is
physically possible
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To pin some numbers on the vague terms we used, we propose to cash out ‘‘quite
low but not spectacularly low’’ as 1 percent and ‘‘spectacularly low’’ as10-50, so
that (P1)–(P3) give rise to the following precise premises:
(1) P(Theism) C 0.01
(2) P(Evil | Theism) = 0.01
(3) P(Tuning | Atheism) = 10-50
We also need the following inequality, which will be justified in a moment:
(4) P(Tuning | Theism & Evil) C 0.01
Using the odds form of Bayes’ theorem, (1)–(4) entail that theism is overwhelm-
ingly more probable than atheism:
(5) P TheismjEvil & Tuningð Þ
P AtheismjEvil & Tuningð Þ ¼
P Evil & TuningjTheismð Þ  P Theismð Þ
P Evil& Tuning jAtheismð Þ  P Atheismð Þ
¼ P EviljTheismð Þ  P TuningjTheism & Evilð Þ  P Theismð Þ
P TuningjAtheismð Þ  P EviljAtheism & Tuningð Þ  P Atheismð Þ
 0:01  0:01  0:01
1050  1  0:99  10
44
(See the ‘‘Appendix’’ for details.)
If theism and atheism are the only hypotheses under consideration, as (P4) says,
so that their respective probabilities add up to 1, then by (5), the posterior
probability of theism is more than 99.9999999999% while the posterior probability
of atheism is less than 0.0000000001%. So (P1)–(P5) ground a rather successful
BSPE if the way we quantified probabilities in (1)–(3) is defensible and if (4) is true.
We’ll cover the last two issues before explaining what we take to be the substantive
message of this whole exercise.
Weproposed to cash out ‘‘quite lowbut not spectacularly low’’ as having a subjective
probability of 1 percent and ‘‘spectacularly low’’ as having a subjective probability of
10-50. These numbers are admittedlyarbitrary to someextent.Whatmatters, as far as the
present dialectic is concerned, is that probabilities that are low but not spectacularly low
are many orders of magnitude higher than spectacularly low ones and only a few orders
of magnitude lower than 1. As long as this criterion is satisfied, the argument goes
through. (The number at the end of (5) will be on the order of 10MANY-2 9 FEW, making
the BSPE successful). What matters is not the choice of numerical values but the set of
underlying qualitative claims, namely (P1), (P2), and (P3).
Lemma (4) needs justification before we move on. In terms of the estimates we
introduced, (4) is tantamount to saying that the probability of fine-tuning,
conditional on God and evil, may be quite low but it is not spectacularly low.
This claim is supported by two thoughts. The first is that the universe is likely to be
law-governed if God permits moral evil, because free action is impossible if agents
cannot make reasonably good predictions about the consequences of their actions
(Swinburne 1998: ch. 10). Further, if God creates a law–governed universe that
contains moral evil, he is not spectacularly unlikely to institute laws that are fine-
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tuned for life, because fine-tuning may have providential significance. For example,
it can supply creatures in an evil–infested world with grounds for thinking that God
exists.1
Turning away from the formal details, we’d like to offer a story to illustrate the
epistemic situation that the theist is in, according to our BSPE.
Clifftown was built on a plateau in an extremely high and precarious mountain
range. There is only one way to approach Clifftown, and the road is so dangerous
that travellers can’t even take backpacks. (We’re assuming that flight is
technologically impossible when the story takes place.) The townspeople must
work with the materials available nearby. Luckily, one of them, the Inventor, was a
very resourceful craftsman who constructed simple machines from iron and various
other stuff found in local mines. No other inhabitant of Clifftown has a talent for
engineering and, obviously, no machine can be smuggled in from outside.
Everyone in Clifftown knows that the Inventor hates bronze. She wouldn’t make
anything out of bronze even if people begged her. This quirk does not trouble the
townsfolk, however. The reason they are worried is that the Inventor seems to have
disappeared. She hasn’t created anything lately and nobody saw her in years.
Although they hope that the Inventor returns, the inhabitants of Clifftown are more
inclined to think that she is dead.
One day, one of the townsmen, Bob, spots a shiny new bronze bicycle in the
streets of Clifftown. He finds this utterly perplexing. The Inventor did make bicycles
in the past, but it seems quite improbable that anyone could have convinced her to
make one out of bronze. On the other hand, the probability that someone else made
the bike, or that the bike was miraculously transported here from outside, or that the
wind assembled it by chance, is spectacularly low. So Bob forms the belief that the
Inventor has been in town and she made a new bicycle, overcoming her fabled
disgust of bronze.
Bob’s posterior credences are rational. His evidence is quite improbable on the
hypothesis that the Inventor created the bike, but his evidence is spectacularly
improbable under the alternative hypothesis.
The structure of this story maps onto the structure of our BSPE. The hypothesis
that the Inventor made the bicycle is analogous to Theism, the negation of this
hypothesis is analogous to Atheism. The fact that the bike is made of bronze
corresponds to evil and the fact that the bike is a machine corresponds to fine–
tuning. Lemma (4) has no obvious analogue in the story, but it can be replaced by an
assumption that does the same technical work.2
The substantive message of our BSPE is that theism is justified for roughly the
same reasons that Bob’s belief in the Inventor’s presence is justified. Even though
1 Halvorson (2018) objects to the fine-tuning argument on the grounds that God might be much more
inclined to create laws that need no fine-tuning, and so fine-tuning may not be evidence for theism. Our
lemma (4) is compatible with this contention. All we require is that God, once he permits moral evil, is
not spectacularly unlikely to fine-tune the laws.
2 The probability of something’s being a machine, conditional on its being bronze and having been made
by Inventor, should not be too low. This is to be expected on the grounds that the Inventor builds
machines out of metal.
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evil constitutes strong evidence against God, fine-tuning is so much stronger
evidence against atheism that theists are perfectly rational to choose theism. More
precisely, this is how our BSPE plays out if the premises are true.
One of the disanalogies between theism and the Clifftown case foreshadows the
main challenge that our BSPE will face later. The hypothesis that someone other
than the Inventor made the bicycle has a spectacularly low probability in the
Clifftown case, because that’s how the thought experiment was constructed. But it is
far from clear that the analogous hypothesis in the debate over theism—the
hypothesis that a supernatural being other than the God of classical theism created
the universe—is spectacularly improbable. In the rest of the paper, we will study
this specific challenge.
Finally, we’d like to point out that the BSPE we presented is not new. It is
adumbrated by Hawthorne and Isaacs (2018: n44) as well as by Collins (2009: 256).
But we believe that it is buried deep enough in the literature to make a detailed
exposition helpful and relevant. Everyone working on the problem of evil should be
aware that the improbability of atheistic fine-tuning can easily outbalance the
evidential impact of evil. Ever since Rowe’s (1979) paper, the philosophical
controversy over evil has been dominated by the thought that evil constitutes
extremely weighty evidence against theism. The BSPE that Collins and others have
alluded to and that we explored above shows that Rowe’s point is at least
questionable as long as the only alternative to theism is naturalistic atheism. As
we’ll see, however, Rowe is right if nonstandard theologies come into play.
Enter Moloch
Our goal is to dismantle the BSPE we outlined. Specifically, we’ll argue that
relaxing (P4)—admitting morally indifferent deities—wrecks the Bayesian case for
theism. We take this to indicate that the evidential problem of evil has a neglected
aspect that lacks a convincing theistic solution. As we will see, this claim can be
justified independently of the BSPE in question, but (P1)–(P5) helps one see how
the two aspects of the evidential problem come apart.
In the rest of the paper, we use ‘‘god’’ in a very wide sense to denote any
supernatural entity or collective or phenomenon that can create a physical universe,
or can manifest as a physical universe, or can give rise to physical reality in some
other way, as long as it does so freely, without being externally compelled. Cosmic
teleology qualifies as a god on the present terminology. So do various communities
of polytheistic gods.
To simplify the discussion, we will focus on one specific alternative theology:
The Moloch Hypothesis
Moloch is an omnipotent being who isn’t morally good in our sense of
‘‘good’’. His desire is to create a universe that exemplifies a huge variety of
aesthetic qualities (beauty, majesty, tragedy, comedy, repulsiveness, absurdity
etc.). As a result, Moloch is quite interested in various forms of evil. For the
same reason, he is very interested in life. He is also interested in quasars,
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comets, wars, continental drift, symbolic poetry, and a host of other things
familiar from the actual world. Being a sort of cosmic aesthete, Moloch is
almost certain to create a physical universe, and if he does so, he is very likely
to create one that is similar to the actual world. (He may create a host of
other universes to observe the multitude of ways beauty and ugliness can
develop, but given the richness of the actual world, he is bound to create one
that looks like it.)
Suppose that the existence of Moloch is just as probable a priori as the existence
of the classical God and that he is exactly as likely to create a fine-tuned universe.
By assumption, evil has a very high probability conditional on Moloch, say .95.
Using the odds form of Bayes’s theorem, we have that
(6) P TheismjEvil & Tuningð Þ
P MolochjEvil & Tuningð Þ ¼
PðEvil & TuningjTheismÞ  P Theismð Þ
Evil& Tuning jMolochð Þ  P Molochð Þ
¼ P EviljTheismð Þ  P TuningjTheism & Evilð Þ  P Theismð Þ




By (6), classical theism is much less probable than the Moloch Hypothesis. So
the Bayesian agent is bound the discard the former if the latter is an admissible
alternative.
This conclusion persists even if (P5) is denied, in other words, even if one admits
evidence beyond evil and fine-tuning. To see why, consider that
(7) P TheismjAll evidenceð Þ
P MolochjAll evidenceð Þ ¼ P All evidencejTheismð ÞP All evidencejMolochð Þ  P Theismð ÞP Molochð Þ
If this ratio heavily favours the Moloch hypothesis, the Bayesian reasoner will
take classical theism to be false. Whether he will take the Moloch hypothesis to be
true depends on the range of relevant alternatives. For example, if naturalistic
atheism, classical theism, and the Moloch Hypothesis are the only contenders,
Moloch will win (if the fine-tuning premise, (P3), holds). But some other form of
supernaturalism may beat even Moloch. What matters is that the game is over for
classical theism if (7) is much lower than 1.
Now the nominator of (7) cannot be greater than P(Evil | Theism), since the
nominator can be decomposed into a product of probabilities that include
P(Evil | Theism) (see ‘‘Appendix’’):
(8) P All evidencejTheismð Þ  P Theismð Þ
¼ P EviljTheismð Þ  P All other evidencejTheism & Evilð Þ  P Theismð Þ
The last two terms in (8) are at most 1, so the whole expression cannot be greater
than P(Evil | Theism). Suppose that the latter, as per (P2), is low but not
spectacularly low. Let’s estimate it at 1 percent.
Assuming that the priors of Theism and Moloch are equal, it follows that
(9) P TheismjAll evidenceð Þ
P MolochjAll evidenceð Þ  0:01P All evidencejMolochð Þ
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Suppose, for illustration, that the probability of our total evidence conditional on
Moloch is high. Say it’s .95. Then by (9), the Moloch Hypothesis is at least 95 times
more likely, all things considered, than theism. Generally, theism is guaranteed to
lose out to Moloch if Moloch is not quite unlikely a priori and if P(All evidence |
Moloch) is not low.
It is safe to say that P(All evidence | Moloch) is not low. Even if our evidence
base includes mystical experience, pleasure, alleged miracles, alleged revelation,
the facts of religious diversity etc., it is hard to find anything in the resulting
package that would be unlikely if Moloch existed, and we see no reason to think that
the package as a whole would be unlikely if Moloch existed. To the contrary, it
seems to us that the kind of world we’re living in has a very high subjective
probability of existing if the Moloch Hypothesis true, in other words, it seems to us
that P(All evidence | Moloch) is quite high.
Note, further, that the Moloch hypothesis is unaffected by the kind of evidence
that could vindicate theism in the debate against naturalistic atheism. Imagine that
we have grounds for thinking that Jesus was resurrected. This piece of evidence
won’t make the numerator of (9) greater, because the numerator cannot be greater
than the probability of evil under theism, which is quite low. On the other hand, the
resurrection of Jesus won’t make the denominator of (9) any lower, because Jesus
could very well have been resurrected by Moloch. Perhaps Moloch is amused by a
cult that is born out of a cosmic misunderstanding but takes over a giant empire,
spreads all over the world, and transforms its followers in all sorts of surprising
ways.
In order to portray the resurrection of Jesus as evidence that is very unlikely
under the Moloch Hypothesis, one would have to claim that something like (10) is
part of our evidence base:
(10) Jesus was resurrected by the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob
But this kind evidence is hard to get. Indeed, if such evidence were available, one
could conclude right away that classical theism is true.
An interlocutor could reply that (10) counts as evidence if Plantinga (2000) is
right and theistic beliefs constitute knowledge whenever the believer’s sensus
divinitatis is working reliably in an appropriate environment. On such a view, theists
know that the Resurrection occurred, and, assuming that knowledge is evidence,
propositions like (10) are parts of their evidence base.
Unfortunately, the belief-forming mechanisms that supposedly generate such
knowledge can only generate that knowledge if theism is true. If all religions were
created by Moloch, then Abrahamic testimony is unreliable, along with our sensus
divinitatis (or perhaps the latter is working in an unfavourable environment). So
even if (10) could in principle be a piece of knowledge, whether (10) is a piece of
knowledge is not known to the Bayesian reasoner.3
3 More technically, the Bayesian reasoner needs evidence that (10) is evidence. As far as we can see, only
some independent evidence for theism will do. See Baker-Hytch (2018) for a closely related worry about
treating religious testimony as evidence.
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Similar remarks apply to religious experience. Just as the resurrection of Jesus
can be explained by the Moloch Hypothesis, so can religious experience. Friends of
Moloch agree that religious experience is evidence for the existence of a deity, but
they deny that the deity in question fits the classical theistic conception. The eternal
bliss that mystics partake of is the bliss of Moloch.
The theist could suggest that her theory offers a better explanation for
resurrection, religious experience (etc.), than the Moloch Hypothesis. But this
objection is worth less in Bayesian terms than it may seem, because theism is not a
very good explanation of evil, whereas the Moloch Hypothesis is. The theist needs
some fact that tells as strongly against Moloch as evil does against the God of
classical theism, and no such facts are apparent.
Even worse, extant theistic strategies against the evidential problem of evil are
useless against Moloch. Defenses and theodicies, interpreted in Bayesian terms,
seek to prevent P(Evil | Theism) from being very low; at the very best, they push it
toward .5. That still leaves theism considerably less probable than Moloch if P(All
evidence | Moloch) is high, which, as we saw, is highly defensible. And even if the
theist claims that God wants there to be evil, the best she can achieve (at the cost of
saying something incredible) is parity with the Moloch Hypothesis. So the Moloch
Hypothesis represents a serious challenge even if the theist is willing to buy into
highly tenuous theories.
Sceptical theism is likewise powerless against Moloch. Sceptical theists believe
that we are cognitively ill-equipped to asses whether evil is strong evidence against
theism. In the present context, this idea seems to be ineffective. The most that the
sceptical theist can achieve is to estimate P(Evil | Theism) at .5 (representing
absolute uncertainty or complete lack of knowledge). But that is not enough in the
present context. Unless some other part of our evidence base is less than .5 likely
under Moloch (which seems not to be the case), Moloch beats classical theism even
if the Bayesian reasoner buys into sceptical theism.
Finally, notice that this reasoning does not turn on the trivial fact that for any
theory T and evidence E such that P(T | E)\ 0, one can find a theory T’ such that
P(T’ | E) = 1. (Just add E as an exception clause to T.) The Moloch Hypothesis is
not a gerrymandered, ad hoc mathematical artefact. Indeed, there are perfectly
reasonable ways to motivate it. Suppose one accepts that fine-tuning is strong
evidence for a creator and one also believes, quite strongly, that bone cancer in
children, genocide, mass rape etc. are strong evidence against a morally good
creator. Together, these two convictions lead naturally to the idea of a morally
indifferent creator. The hypothesis of a morally indifferent creator explains both
types of evidence, order and evil. So the Moloch Hypothesis, which is just one
specific version of the indifferent-creator theory, is far from being a mere
mathematical artefact.
Nor are such theories mere dialectical gimmicks. Aristotle’s prime mover,
Plotinos’s One, and Spinoza’s substance are sufficiently similar to Moloch to
qualify as significantly more probable on Bayesian grounds, along the lines of (9),
than the God of classical theism. As far as we know, nobody objected to these
conceptions on the grounds that they are ad hoc.
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Resisting Moloch a priori
Classical theism loses out to Moloch if the latter is a priori just as probable as the
former. Conversely, if the Moloch hypothesis is improbable a priori, it ceases to
constitute a genuine challenge, as indicated by (7):
(7) P TheismjAll evidenceð Þ
P MolochjAll evidenceð Þ ¼ P All evidencejTheismð ÞP All evidencejMolochð Þ  P Theismð ÞP Molochð Þ
If P(Moloch) can be shown to be so low that it offsets the contribution of evil to
the numerator, then theism prevails. Indeed, this seems to be the only strategy
available to the theist. She needs to show that Moloch is a priori significantly less
probable than the Abrahamic God.
It is very easy to render P(Moloch) extremely low: adopt subjective Bayesianism.
According to subjective Bayesians, the distribution of priors is a game without any
rules beyond mathematical consistency. Your priors depend on nothing but your
preexisting beliefs or intuitions.4 On subjective Bayesian grounds, the problem of
Moloch is trivial to solve.
Subjective Bayesianism offers a similarly easy solution to the standard problem
of evil: set P(Atheism) fantastically low and you’re done. This fact indicates that
subjective Bayesianism is unable to model the dialectical situation in the philosophy
of religion. Arbitrary intuitions about priors seem inappropriate in that context. A
more reasonable principle is that the priors obey certain constraints: a priori
probabilities are fixed (within vague but not too wide limits) by a priori knowledge.5
We are not aware of commonly accepted a priori truths that the theist could
deploy against Moloch, so we believe that theists have a problem here. At best, they
have to explain how their preexisting a priori knowledge renders Moloch
improbable. At worst, they must acknowledge a new, potentially unsolvable
version of the evidential problem of evil.
To round off the discussion, we’ll consider one specific a priori strategy against
Moloch, the suggestion that moral perfection is a consequence of some of the
attributes that creator gods are supposed to have. For example, following Swinburne
(2004: 99–106), the theist could argue that omniscience entails moral perfection,
because an all-knowing being knows all moral truths, and moral truths, in turn, are
intrinsically motivating. Or, following Zagzebski (1997: 306), the theist could claim
that omniscience entails compassion. Or, focusing specifically to Moloch, the theist
could suggest that being a cosmic aesthete entails an appreciation of, and desire for,
moral goodness.6
We believe that arguments in this vicinity rest on two questionable premises. The
first is that there is a metaphysically necessary connection between beingmotivated to
be good and some supernatural trait (for example, omnisicence, or being a cosmic
aesthete). We don’t think that such alleged entailments constitute a priori knowledge.
Amoral omniscient beings and amoral cosmic aesthetes seem perfectly conceivable.
4 De Finetti (1980). For opposition, see Williamson (2010) and Williamson (2000: ch. 9).
5 See Horwich (1982: 70f) for more on this principle.
6 We thank an anonymous referee for these suggestions.
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Second, these arguments presuppose moral realism, more specifically, they
presuppose that human well-being is objectively valuable. But this sort of human–
centric moral realism is not a piece of a priori knowledge either. As one friend of
morally indifferent deities put it:
After men persuaded themselves that everything which happens, happens on
their account, they had to judge that what is most important in each thing is
what is most useful to them, and to rate as most excellent all those things by
which they were most pleased. Hence, they had to form these notions, by
which they explained natural things: good, evil, order, confusion, warm, cold,
beauty, ugliness. […] [A]ll the notions by which ordinary people are
accustomed to explain Nature are only modes of imagining, and do not
indicate the nature of anything, only the constitution of the imagination. […]
[T]he perfection of things is to be judged solely from their nature and power;
things are not more or less perfect because they please or offend men’s senses,
or because they are of use to, or are incompatible with, human nature.
(Spinoza: Ethics, part I appendix, 1994: 113–115)
We are not advocating Spinozism. We claim that it is not known to be false. And
so its negation cannot be used to make P(Moloch) low.
An interlocutor could suggest that something less than knowledge is enough here:
a reasonable level of a priori certainty will do. If the theist thinks that human well-
being is objectively valuable and if she is certain that being omniscient (or being a
cosmic aesthete) entails recognizing its value, then she has a good a priori case
against Moloch.
To asses this response, we’ll focus on one specific a priori strategy against
Moloch, the one inspired by Swinburne. This strategy rests on two basic claims:
(H) Human-centric moral realism is true (human well-being is objectively
valuable)
(M) Moral truths are intrinsically motivating (moral judgments result in moral
motivation)
According to the interlocutor, it is sufficient for the theist to be reasonably certain
that these propositions are true. It is not required that these propositions constitute a
priori knowledge.7
The interlocutor’s suggestion adds another layer of complexity to the debate. In
Bayesian terms, the interlocutor recommends extending the Bayesian calculus to
potential a priori evidence, specifically, to H and M.
Suppose that such an extension makes sense. Then the a priori probability of
Moloch can be decomposed in the following way:
(11) P Molochð Þ ¼ P MolochjH & Mð Þ  P H & Mð Þ þ PðMolochj H_MÞ
PðH_MÞ
7 Note that theists who use this strategy cannot subscribe to Divine Command Theory to secure moral
realism, on pain of making their case against Moloch question-begging.
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To simplify, suppose that Moloch is by definition omniscient and therefore
P(Moloch | H & M) is 0. And let’s estimate P(Molochj H_M) at 0.5, on the
grounds that (H_M) by itself does not either support or weaken the Moloch
Hypothesis.
One can decompose the prior of theism in a similar way:
(12) P Theismð Þ ¼ P TheismjH&Mð Þ  P H&Mð Þ þ PðTheismj H_MÞ  PðH_MÞ
We want to be generous to the theist, so we estimate P(Theism | H & M) at 1,
assuming that moral realism entails theism. (It probably does not, of course, but
never mind.) And we will estimate P(Theism | * H _ * M) at 0.5.8 Again, this
point may be contested, since the falsity of H alone is pretty likely to render theism
false. But we’re trying to be generous to the theist.
Putting (11) and (12) together and using the estimates, we have that
(13) P Theismð Þ
P Molochð Þ ¼
1P H&Mð Þþ0:5PðH_MÞ
0:5PðH_MÞ ¼
2P H & Mð Þ
PðH_MÞ þ 1
Using tricks discussed under (8) and (9), one can estimate the ratio of
P(A posteriori evidence | Theism) and P(A posteriori evidence | Moloch) to be
approximately equal to P(Evil | Theism). For illustrative purposes, take the latter to
be .01. Then by (7) and (13), it follows that theism is more probable than Moloch,
all things considered, if the following inequality holds:




Since the right-hand side is 49.5, this inequality says, in essence, that H & M is
overwhelmingly more likely a priori than its negation.
We don’t see how the theist can secure (14) by appealing to commonly accepted
constraints on the relevant priors. In order to portray H & M as overwhelmingly
more likely a priori than its negation, the theist should produce knock-down
arguments for two extremely weighty philosophical principles, namely a form of
moral realism (= H) and anti-Humeanism about moral motivation (= M).9 No
knock-down arguments exist for these theories. Generally, the a priori probability of
controversial philosophical theories can’t be significantly higher than .5. Using .6 as
a conservative estimate and assuming that H and M are independent, the left-hand
side of (14) is at most 0.56 (= 0.36/0.64). So (14) is guaranteed to be false.
More simply, consider that (14) is false if one of * H and * M fails to be
considerably unlikely a priori. Since morally imperfect omniscient beings are prima
8 If P(Theism | * H _ * M) = P(Moloch | * H _ * M) = 0.5, then theism and Moloch are the only
alternatives, assuming (* H _ * M). This is unrealistic, but one can pretend that the probabilities are
normalized within a subspace of the whole probability space.
9 Alternatively, the theist can give up M and accept Humeanism about moral motivation, assuming that
moral motivation requires, in addition to moral judgment, a desire to follow the moral rules. To secure a
link between being a god and being moral, the theist will then have to claim that being a god somehow
entails the desire to be moral. This premise seems even less harder to secure than M.
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facie positively conceivable, * H does not seem too unlikely a priori. So (14)
seems to be false. And note that (14) itself is based on two implausible premises that
help the theist, the premise that P(Theism | * H _ * M) is 0.5 and the premise
that P(Theism | H & M) is 1. More realistic estimates will make it even harder for
the theist to avoid defeat. For example, if P(Theism | H & M) is .75 and P(Theism
| * H _ * M) is .25, then by (7), (11), and (12), and leaving the rest of the earlier
estimates in place,10 it follows that P(Evil | Theism) should be at least 0.744 in order
for theism to avoid defeat. That’s a tall order.
The Swinburnian strategy against Moloch fails the test of Bayesianism. Although
we used specific quantitative estimates, we believe that the qualitative point is valid:
in order for theism to prevail against Moloch, (* H _ * M) should be at least as
improbable (compared to its negation) as evil is under theism.11 Since both * H
and * M seem at least moderately probable, the Swinburnian strategy fails. Similar
points could be raised against the other a priori anti-Moloch arguments that we
mentioned earlier.
Conclusion
Evil presents an under-discussed challenge to the theist, the challenge of fending off
morally indifferent gods. Such gods seem more likely a posteriori than the God of
classical theism, and extant theistic tools for solving the evidential problem of evil
do not work against them. It appears that theists can only solve the challenge of
indifferent gods by portraying them as a priori relatively unlikely. We argued that
one potential strategy—linking divine traits to moral perfection—fails on Bayesian
grounds.
Although our dialectic focused on a specific Bayesian attempt to solve to the
problem of evil, namely (P1)–(P5), we believe that our conclusion generalizes. The
Bayesian case for Moloch and his ilk does not depend on the details of the argument
we examined. We tried to illustrate that the evidential problem of evil has at least
two aspects: an a posteriori one that concerns the challenge of naturalistic atheism,
and an a priori one that concerns the challenge of morally indifferent gods.
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Appendix
The odds form of Bayes’s theorem, used in (5), (6), and (7), relates the ratio of the
probability of two hypotheses, conditional on our evidence, to the ratio of the
evidence’s probability, conditional on the hypotheses in question:
(I) P AjEð Þ
P BjEð Þ ¼ P EjAð ÞP Að ÞP EjBð ÞP Bð Þ
This formula (like most Bayesian formulae) follows from the definition of
conditional probability:
(II) P AjEð Þ ¼ P A&Eð Þ
P Eð Þ
which entails that
(III) P AjEð Þ ¼ P EjAð Þ  P Að Þ
P Eð Þ
which, in turn, entails (I).
In the main text, (5), (6), and (8) use the following formula to decompose the
probability of complex evidence (E & F) conditional on some hypothesis A:
(IV) P E&FjAð Þ ¼ P EjAð Þ  P FjA&Eð Þ
This theorem is also a direct consequence of (I):
(V) P E&FjAð Þ ¼ P A&E&Fð Þ
PðAÞ ¼ P A&Eð ÞPðAÞ  P A&E&Fð ÞPðA&EÞ
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